

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 212711

41

ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

66650

DRAFTED BY:S/S:FVORTIZ

APPROVED BY:S/S:FVORTIZ

----- 011917

R 081705Z SEP 75

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T STATE 212711

NODIS

CHEROKEE

FOLLOWING TEL SENT ACTION SECSTATE FROM AMMAN DTG 051520Z

SEP 75 RPTD TO YOU:

QUOTE:

S E C R E T AMMAN 5937

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, US, JO, XF

SUBJECT: JORDAN'S STAND ON SINAI AGREEMENT

REFS: STATE 210915; AMMAN 5935

1. SUMMARY: (AMMAN 5935 SUMMARIZES THE MAJOR POINTS OF THIS TELEGRAM AND SHOULD BE READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH IT.)

2. I TALKED WITH RIFAI MORNING SEPTEMBER 6 RE STATE REFTEL. BEGAN BY TELLING HIM THAT WE WERE EXTREMELY CONCERNED AND DISAPPOINTED AT PUBLIC HANDLING OF JORDAN'S POSITION ON INTERIM AGREEMENT. I REFERRED TO FBIS REPORT AND THEN GAVE HIM A COPY. I TOLD HIM WE COULD ONLY
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 212711

CONCLUDE THAT JORDAN WAS TAKING A BACKHANDED NEGATIVE VIEW OF THE ARRANGEMENT BY THE WORDING OF THIS STATEMENT AND THAT WE HAD HOPED FOR A MUCH MORE POSITIVE POSITION FROM JORDAN. I REVIEWED FOR HIM AGAIN THE NUMBER OF TIMES

JORDAN ENCOURAGED US TO GO AHEAD WITH THE AGREEMENT, TO REMAIN INVOLVED, AND TO KEEP THE DIPLOMATIC PROCESS TOWARD A SETTLEMENT IN MOTION. LATEST AGREEMENT DID ALL OF THAT AND WE WOULD EXPECT SOME POSITIVE REACTION FROM JORDAN.

3. I THEN ADDED THAT WE HAVE UNDERSTOOD JORDAN AND SYRIAN CONCERNS ABOUT NOT DIVIDING THE ARAB STATES AND ABOUT MAKING PROGRESS ON ALL FRONTS. SECRETARY HAD AGAIN MADE THIS CLEAR TO JORDAN AT THE MEETING WITH HIS MAJESTY. WE WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE AND THIS STEP IS NOT AN END TO THE PROCESS. I THEN ADDED THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF AGREEMENT ON SINAI, INDEED JORDANIAN LEAD IN URGING ON US GENERAL STEP-BY-STEP STRATEGY, WE WOULD HOPE FOR A DISTINCTLY MORE POSITIVE REACTION FROM JORDAN. FINALLY I SAID JORDANIAN POSITION WAS NOW VIEWED AS NEGATIVE AND THIS WOULD NOT HELP US IN OUR COMING BATTLES WITH CONGRESS. FOR IF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, PUBLIC AND CONGRESS ALL SAW THE POSITION THAT WAY, THE CHANCES OF MOVING THE AGREEMENT AND OUR BILATERAL QUESTIONS POSITIVELY WOULD NOT BE IMPROVED.

4. RIFAI READ THE STATEMENT AND SAID YES THIS IS WHAT WE HAD SAID. HE THEN ADDED WITH SOME VEHEMENCE THAT HE HAD HEARD THE ANNOUNCEMENT ON VOA THAT JORDAN RECEIVED WITH GREAT SATISFACTION THE AGREEMENT. HE WAS NOT TAKING A POSITION AGAINST THE AGREEMENT, BUT ONLY AGAINST THE STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO JORDAN WHICH WERE FALSE. IT HURT HIM TO THINK THAT THIS WAS A U.S. GOVERNMENT STATION CARRYING STATEMENTS WHICH DID NOT REFLECT ANYTHING THAT JORDAN HAD SAID. HE ADDED THAT REUTERS, AP, UPI, ETC., HAD ALL CARRIED THE SAME LINE FROM AMMAN AND THAT THIS MUST HAVE REFLECTED A "US BRIEFING". I TOLD HIM THAT I WAS WITH THE SECRETARY THE WHOLE TIME AND KNEW OF NO SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 212711

US BRIEFING. SECONDLY, HE WAS BEGINNING TO SOUND LIKE IDDE AMIN IN UGANDA WHO BLAMED EVERY REPORT CARRIED ON BBC ON THE UK GOVERNMENT. HE SAID THAT VOA DOES NOT CARRY PLO STATEMENTS CRITICAL OF THE US AND I SAID I WAS SURE THEY DID. I ADDED THAT IT WAS THE FIRST TIME I HAD HEARD OF ANY VOA CONNECTION, BUT THAT I THOUGHT THE ANNOUNCEMENT REFERRED TO BEIRUT PRESS REPORTS AND WAS THEREFORE OVERREACTING AND UNDULY NEGATIVE. HE ASSURED ME THIS WAS NOT THE CASE AND THAT HE HAD FELT CONSTRAINED TO REPLY. HE WAS NOT GOING TO TAKE A PUBLIC POSITION ON THE AGREEMENT, BUT MIGHT BE REQUIRED TO DO SO IN THE FUTURE. THE VOA STATEMENT THREATENED TO UNDERMINE

A POLICY OF TWO YEARS STANDING OF BUILDING UP HIS GOOD RELATIONS IN THE ARAB WORLD AND HE WOULD NOT DO THAT. COMMENT: IT IS VERY CLEAR THAT RIFAI FEELS HIS ARAB CREDENTIALS ARE AT STAKE IN THE REACTION TO THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. END COMMENT.

5. FURTHER, RIFAI SAID HE AGREED WITH THE POINTS WHICH I HAD MADE, BUT IF HE HAD TO COME OUT PUBLICLY ON THOSE POINTS IN A POSITIVE SENSE, HE WOULD ALSO HAVE TO COME OUT NEGATIVELY ON THE PRICE WITH EGYPT HAD PAID. IT WAS TOO MUCH FOR THE AGREEMENT AND WHY DID THE US WORRY ABOUT THAT WHEN, ACCORDING TO THE RECORD OF THE SECRETARY'S CONVERSATION IN DAMASCUS WHICH SYRIA HAD SENT HIM THE EVENING OF THE DAY YOU WERE THERE, THE SECRETARY HAD TOLD ASAD THIS WAS AN ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT AND NOT ONE WHICH THE US WAS ENGAGED IN. AS A RESULT HE FOUND IT HARD TO UNDERSTAND WHY WE WERE SO DISTURBED AT WHAT HAD BEEN SAID WHICH MERELY REPEATED THE JORDANIAN POSITION THAT THEY HAD NOT COMMENTED ON THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. I TOLD RIFAI THAT THE JORDANIAN STATEMENT DID NOT CONVEY THE SENSE OF A POSITIVE POINT OF VIEW WHICH WE HAD COME TO EXPECT AND WE WERE DISAPPOINTED BY WHAT HAD BEEN SAID.

6. SOMEWHERE IN THE MIDDLE OF OUR DISCUSSION RIFAI WAS INTERRUPTED BY A PHONE CALL FROM SYRIA TO SAY THAT KHADDAM WAS COMING TO AMMAN TOMORROW. RIFAI NOTED THAT THEY WOULD DO THEIR BEST TO HELP KEEP THE SYRIANS SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 212711

TONED DOWN. HE SAID AGAIN REFERRING TO THE RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION ASAD SENT HIM THAT ASAD HAD TOLD YOU HE WOULD MAKE NO GOVERNMENTAL STATEMENTS OR DECISIONS ON A NEXT STEP WITHOUT JORDANIAN ACCEPTANCE OR AT LEAST CONSULTATION. HE WOULD DO WHAT HE COULD TO KEEP SYRIANS TONED DOWN, BUT HE RECOGNIZED, WHEN I POINTED IT OUT, THAT BAATH PARTY STATEMENTS CONDEMNING THE AGREEMENT WERE NOT DISTINGUISHABLE IN THE U.S. FROM WHAT THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT WAS PRESUMED TO BELIEVE. IT WAS JUST A DEVICE. IN ADDITION, RIFAI INTIMATED THAT HE MIGHT BE PUSHED BY SYRIA TO BE NEGATIVE ON THE AGREEMENT, PERHAPS IN THE FORM OF ATTACKING EGYPT. SADAT'S SPEECH HAD NOT HELPED, AND BESIDES WHAT DID THE US CARE IF THE EGYPTIAN CONCESSIONS TO ISRAEL WERE ATTACKED. THAT WAS BETWEEN THE ARABS NOT THE U.S. EGYPT HAD GIVEN MUCH TOO MUCH. IF JORDAN HAD DONE THAT A FEW YEARS AGO IT WOULD HAVE GOTTEN BACK NINETY-FIVE PERCENT OF THE WEST BANK. I POINTED OUT TO RIFAI THAT THE ARABS HAD NOTHING TO GAIN BY DIVIDING THEMSELVES UP ALL OVER THE PLACE. THEY HAD OF COURSE TO CHOOSE WHAT WAS IN THEIR OWN INTEREST, BUT BY ATTACKING SADAT THEY WERE REALLY ONLY PLAYING INTO THE HANDS OF THE ISRAELIS. FURTHER, ALL

HIS ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE EGYPTIANS BEING "OUT OF PLAY" SEEMED ONLY TO MAKE SENSE IF THAT IS WHAT THE ISRAELIS REALLY THOUGHT AND ACTED ON. BUT I HAD SEEN NO POSSIBILITY THAT THE ISRAELIS REALLY BELIEVED THEY COULD COUNT ON EGYPT NOT CONTINUING TO PRESS FOR PROGRESS IN A CONFLICT. AS A RESULT THE FEARS WHICH THE ARABS HAD ABOUT EGYPT'S PRESUMED STATE OF NON-BELLIGERENCY HAD LITTLE REAL MEANING IN THE MIDDLE EAST UNLESS THE ARABS THEMSELVES BECAME DEEPLY DIVIDED OVER THE ISSUE.

7. AT ONE POINT RIFAI REPEATED WHAT THEY HAD SAID ABOUT JORDAN SUPPORTING THE US ROLE, THE SECRETARY'S EFFORTS AND COUNTED ON THE US MAKING MORE PROGRESS. HE SAID HOWEVER THAT FRANKLY HE WAS NOT VERY SANGUINE ABOUT PROGRESS ON THE GOLAN. HE HOPED IT WOULD COME, BUT HE DID NOT THINK SO. HE THEN SAID THAT IF THE US WAS DISAPPOINTED IN JORDAN'S STATEMENT ABOUT THE AGREEMENT, WHAT WAS THE US DOING TO PROTEST
SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 212711

A STATEMENT HE SAID RABIN MADE LAST NIGHT WHICH INDICATED THAT SECRETARY HAD AGREED THAT ONLY 200-300 METERS DISENGAGEMENT ON GOLAN WAS POSSIBLE AND THEREFORE SYRIA COULD NOT ACCEPT AND GOLAN WAS DEAD LETTER. LATER RIFAI ALSO SAID THAT HE HAD TRIED TO MAKE JORDANIAN ANNOUNCEMENT AS LOW KEY AS POSSIBLE AND THE ATTRIBUTATIONS TO UNKNOWN SPOKESMAN WAS DESIGNED TO DO THIS. HE COULD HAVE SAID NOTHING LESS. YESTERDAY HE HAD HAD TO USE FORCE TO BREAK UP PLO OFFICE-SPONSORED MARCH ON EGYPTIAN EMBASSY. THE REFUGEE CAMPS WERE RESTIVE AND COMPLAINING AND HE HAD RECEIVED A LOT OF PRESSURE FROM JORDANIANS ON WHY JORDAN DID NOT DECLARE ITS VIEW. HE ADDED THAT IF PRESS SOURCES HAD REPORTED JORDAN AS BEING NEGATIVE ON THE QUESTION, HE WOULD HAVE MADE THE SAME STATEMENT TO THE PRESS. HE ALSO INDICATED SOX IRRITATION AT WHAT US PRESS SPOKESMAN HAD REPORTEDLY SAID TO PRESS HERE: "ASKING HOW CAN ANDERSON SPEAK FOR JORDAN ON THIS SUBJECT." I AM UNAWARE OF A Y SUCH PRESS BRIEFING AND TOLD RIFAI SO. HOWEVER, IF ONE WAS GIVEN I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT WAS SAID.

8. FINALLY, RIFAI NOTED THAT SYRIANS HAD GIVEN THEM VERBATIM RECORD OF SECRETARY'S CONVERSATIONS WITH ASAD. RIFAI SAID HE HAD NOTED SEVERAL INCONSISTENCIES WITH WHAT HAD BEEN SAID HERE. HE CITED FACT THAT SECRETARY REPORTEDLY TOLD ASAD THAT ISRAELIS WANTED US OBSERVERS AND INSISTED ON IT, WITH POINT RIFAI SAID WAS MADE HERE THAT SADAT FIRST SUGGESTED IT AND WANTED IT. I TOLD RIFAI THAT MY RECOLLECTION OF CONVERSATION NOT PERFECT ON THIS POINT, BUT IT WAS MY IMPRESSION THAT WE HAD INDICATED BOTH PARTIES WANTED US OBSERVERS

IN THE SINAI. RIFAI ADDED THAT MEMCON WHICH HE SNT TO SYRIA, IN CONTRAST TO ONE SYRIANS GAVE HIM, WAS NOT A VERBATIM RECORD AND IN MANY AREAS HAD ONLY HEADINGS OR TOPICAL SENTENCES OMITTING, AS HE SAID, ANY AREAS OF " INCONSISTENCY."

9. RIFAI WENT OVER IN SOME DETAIL POINTS TO WHICH THEY OBJECTED IN INTERIM AGREEMENT -- AREAS ON WHICH EGYPT HAD GIVEN TOO MUCH. HE CITED REGULAR RENEWALS SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 212711

OF AGREEMENT, NON-BELLIGERENCY -- AGREEMENTS NOT TO USE FORCE, ISRAELI CARGOES IN CANAL, IS OBSERVERS IN THE PASSES, MASSIVE US AID TO ISRAEL. HE ALSO ASKED WHAT ARE THE SECRET AGREEMENTS THAT SECRETARY SPOKE OF TO SFRC. I TOLD HIM THAT MANY OF THE AREAS HE OBJECTED TO HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER IN FIRST DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT AND THAT I HAD NO INFORMATION ON ANY SECRET AGREEMENTS OR UNDERSTANDINGS THE SECRETARY HAD REFERRED TO. RIFAI SAID IN THE CASE OF THE LATTER, IF THE SECRETARY TELLS CONGRESS, THEN WE WILL HEAR ABOUT THEM SOONER OR LATER.

10. RIFAI TURNED AGAIN TO EGYPT. H SAID THAT JORDAN HAD TRIED TO PLAY A MIDDLE ROLE IN THE ARAB WORLD. NOW BECAUSE HE HAD SENT A LETTER TO EGYPT ON OVERLY HIGH STUDENT FEES FOR VISITING JORDANIANS THE EGYPTIANS WERE RELEASING THE NEWS THAT A SPECIAL LETTER HAD COME TO THEM, IMPLYING JORDAN WAS SUPPORTING EGYPT ON THE AGREEMENT. HE WAS ALSO MAD THAT EGYPTIANS WERE MAKING ANNOUNCEMENTS ABOUT A VISIT BY KING WITH PUBLIC PREPARATIONS AND SO FORTH. COMMENT: IT IS CLEAR THAT ONE OF THE MOST GALLING ASPECTS HERE OF THE AGREEMENT IS THE EGYPTIAN SEPARATION WHICH OTHER ARABS ASSUME IT HAS CAUSED. END COMMENT. RIFAI THEN ADDED THAT JORDAN HAD TRIED TO BE IN THE MIDDLE IN THE ARAB WORLD, BETWEEN EGYPT AND SYRIA. BUT WITH THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND THE LOSS OF US SUPPORT THEY COULD NOT DO THIS AND AS RESULT HAD TO LOOK MORE TO SYRIA. FINALLY, ON THE CONNECTION WITH THE COMING CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE, RIFAI SAID IT WAS STRANGE THAT THE US WAS CONCERNED NOW ABOUT JORDAN'S POINT OF VIEW, "WE SO OFTEN THOUGHT YOU TOOK US FOR GRANTED." THE CONGRESS HAD HUMILIATED HIS MAJESTY IN THE HAWK DEAL, HOW CAN WE NOW BE THOUGHT TO BE SO INFLUENTIAL THERE. REMINDED RIFAI THAT ONLY A SMALL PORTION OF CONGRESS HAD ACTED ON THE HAWK SALE. JORDAN'S VIEWS WOULD STILL BE INFLUENTIAL AND THAT JUST AS WE DID NOT ASSUME PLO VIEWS WERE REPRESENTATIVE OF WHAT THE ARAB STATES THOUGHT, SO HE COULD NOT ASSUME THAT WHAT SOME CONGRESSMEN HAD SAID WAS THE CONSIDERED VIEW OF THE US GOVERNMENT ON JORDAN OR THE HAWKS.

SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 212711

QQM RIFAI THEN NOTED THAT SAUDIS HAD PUBLICLY SUPPORTD AGREEMENT AFTER THE SECRETARY'S VISIT. H SAID THAT NOW THEY ARE BEGINNING TO CHANGE THEIR MINDS AND HE WOULD EXPECT SHORTLY TO SEE SOME SHIFT IN THEIR PUBLIC POSITION.

12. AT THE END, I TOLD RIFAI AGAIN WE WERE DISAPPOINTED. HE SAID HE WAS SORRY, BUT THAT HAD NOT BEEN THEIR INTENTION AND HE WANTED EVERYONE TO KNOW IT. IF JORDAN WERE TO TAKE A POSITIVE VIEW ON THE AGREEMENT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE US, ITS ROLE AND INTENTIONS, THEN IT WOULD HAVE TO BE NEGATIVE ABOUT WHAT EGYPT HAD AGREED TO. IN TH FUTURE THEY WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER JORDAN'S INTERESTS IN WHATEVER THEY SAID BUT A TIME MIGHT COME WHEN THEY HAD TO BE NEGATIVE. I TOLD HIM THIS WOULD BE A MISTAKE AND THAT WE NEEDED ARAB SUPPORT TO CONTINUE DOING WHAT JORDAN HAD ALWAYS WANTED US TO DO -- MAKE MORE PROGRESS ON NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID HE WOULD SEE WHAT HE COULD DO TO HELP WITH KHADDAM.

13. RECOMMEND DEPARTMENT PASS CAIRO, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV.
PICKERING UNQUOTE
KISSINGER

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 26 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PRESS COMMENTS, AGREEMENTS, CAT-B, CHEROKEE 09/08/75, GOVERNMENT REACTIONS, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 08 SEP 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: greeneet
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975STATE212711
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter:
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: N750004-0187
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t197509103/baaaaavy.tel
Line Count: 301
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: greeneet
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 30 JUL 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <30 JUL 2003 by ShawDG>; APPROVED <28 NOV 2003 by greeneet>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: LOCK1
Status: NATIVE
Subject: n/a
TAGS: PFOR, US, JO, XF, (RIFAI, ZAYD)
To: CAIRO
DAMASCUS
TEL AVIV
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006